

Gender, Islamic Law, and Sustainability

VOL. 1 NO. 1 (2026)

ISSN: XXX-XXX

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To cite this article. E. Safri, A. Budiman and E. Saputra “Islamic Law on the Rejection of Sunnah: A Critical Analysis of Dalimi Lubis's Thought in the Discourse on Hadith Authority”, *Gender, Islamic Law, and Sustainability*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 60-74, 2026. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.70211/gils.v1i1.391>

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Published online: 28 February 2026



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Islamic Law on the Rejection of Sunnah: A Critical Analysis of Dalimi Lubis's Thought in the Discourse on Hadith Authority

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Received: 22 December 2026

Revised: 24 January 2026

Accepted: 27 January 2026

Online: 28 February 2026

Abstract

This study examines the thoughts of Dalimi Lubis regarding the rejection of hadith and sunnah within the perspective of Islamic law through a comprehensive literature review approach. The main objective is to critically assess Lubis's arguments on the supremacy of the Qur'an as the sole source of Islamic law and to explore the theoretical and practical implications of this view for the authority of sharia. The research employs qualitative analysis of various literature sources, including classical Islamic legal texts, contemporary scholarly works, and academic publications related to Lubis's thought. By analyzing these sources, the study aims to trace the intellectual foundations of his arguments and evaluate their consistency with established Islamic jurisprudence. The findings indicate that Lubis's views contradict the consensus of scholars (ijma'), which recognizes the sunnah as the second essential source of law after the Qur'an, and suggest that rejecting the sunnah could disrupt the methodology of legal reasoning (istinbat) and the application of Islamic law in practice. The novelty of this study lies in its critical synthesis of Lubis's arguments with normative literature, providing an integrated perspective that links theoretical discourse with the broader framework of Islamic legal thought. This approach highlights both the conceptual and practical consequences of disregarding the sunnah while reaffirming that the combined guidance of the Qur'an and sunnah constitutes the foundational basis for preserving the coherence, legitimacy, and authority of the Islamic legal system.

Keywords: Islamic Law; Sunnah; Hadith; Dalimi Lubis; Sharia Authority, Literature Review

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
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INTRODUCTION

The Hadith, or Sunnah, of Prophet Muhammad, represents one of the most important sources of Islamic teachings, functioning as a complement to the Qur'an. While the Qur'an serves as the primary source of guidance, the Sunnah elaborates on its directives, providing detailed frameworks for legal, social, and moral behavior. The Sunnah's dual role as both a theological and legal authority makes it indispensable in the formation of Islamic law, or Shari'ah [1], [2]. Historically, however, the Sunnah's authority has been challenged by various intellectual movements within the Muslim world, most notably by the Inkar al-Sunnah (Rejection of the Sunnah) movement. This movement, which emerged in the early centuries of Islam, has gained renewed attention in contemporary debates, particularly with the rise of reformist and rationalist thought in the 19th and 20th centuries [3], [4]. The resurgence of Inkar al-Sunnah advocates, such as Dalimi Lubis, highlights a growing divide in Islamic legal scholarship concerning the role of Hadith in the development of Islamic law [5].

This study delves into the critique of the Sunnah by Dalimi Lubis, an influential figure in the Indonesian intellectual landscape. Lubis, following the tradition of rationalist thought, argues that the Qur'an alone is sufficient for guiding Muslims in matters of law and ethics, thus rendering the Sunnah unnecessary [6]. His perspective aligns with the broader Qur'āniyyūn movement, which holds that the Qur'an, as the final revelation, is a complete and self-sufficient guide, leaving little room for additional sources such as Hadith. This position, however, runs counter to the consensus among Islamic jurists, who have historically considered the Sunnah as the second most authoritative source of Islamic law after the Qur'an [7], [8].

To understand Dalimi Lubis's critique within the broader context of Islamic jurisprudence, it is essential to consider the theories that underlie Islamic legal thought. The foundational theory of *ushūl al-fiqh* (Islamic legal methodology) forms the backbone of this analysis. According to traditional *ushūl al-fiqh*, Islamic law is derived from two primary sources: the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Sunnah, as defined in classical Islamic scholarship, includes the sayings, actions, and approvals of the Prophet Muhammad, serving to clarify and expand upon the Qur'anic text [9], [10], [11]. In contrast, critique challenges this framework, proposing that the Qur'an alone is sufficient for legal and ethical guidance, thereby eliminating the need for a secondary source [12], [13], [14].

The concept of *istinbāt al-aḥkām* (legal deduction) also plays a crucial role in understanding Lubis's argument. Legal deduction in Islamic law traditionally relies on both the Qur'an and the Sunnah to derive legal rulings [15], [16], [17]. Lubis's rejection of the Sunnah raises questions about how legal reasoning would function if only the Qur'an were considered as a source. Would it lead to a reformulation of legal methods, or would it fundamentally undermine the structure of Islamic law?

The rejection of the Sunnah has been the subject of considerable debate within Islamic thought. While the classical Islamic legal tradition affirms the Sunnah's role as an integral source of law, recent scholarship has highlighted the resurgence of Inkar al-Sunnah movements, especially within reformist circles. Studies by Alsuhaymi [18] and Rahman [15]

note that the critique of Hadith often intersects with modern concerns about the authenticity and transmission of religious texts, with proponents of the Qur'āniyyūn movement arguing that the Qur'an is clear and complete in itself. Similarly, Muzakki observe that Lubis's critique aligns with this broader intellectual shift, which questions the necessity of Hadith in Islamic legal theory [6].

International scholars such as Fouz Mohamed Zacky have examined the epistemological implications of rejecting the Sunnah, highlighting the tension between traditionalist and reformist approaches to Islamic law [19]. Yılmaz's work, in particular, situates the rejection of Hadith as part of a broader epistemological debate over the role of historical and cultural constructs in shaping religious authority [20]. While Lubis's perspective has been influential in Indonesian discourse, limited attention has been given to the broader implications of his views on legal theory and practice [21].

Studies on the Indonesian context, such as those by Suprianto & Alfian [22], focus primarily on the sociopolitical consequences of Lubis's critique, with some scholars suggesting that his views represent a form of theological reform that challenges traditionalist authority. However, these studies often overlook the normative implications of Lubis's rejection of the Sunnah, particularly its impact on *istinbāt al-aḥkām* and the practical functioning of Islamic law [6]. Furthermore, there remains a gap in research regarding how Lubis's critique interacts with other intellectual movements within the Muslim world and its potential to reshape Islamic jurisprudence.

While significant work has been done on the historical development of the *Inkar al-Sunnah* movement, few studies have systematically analyzed its implications for contemporary Islamic legal methodology [23]. There is a notable gap in the literature regarding how the rejection of Hadith affects the process of *istinbāt al-aḥkām* and the broader structure of *uṣhūl al-fiqh*. Existing studies have primarily focused on the theological and sociopolitical dimensions of the *Inkar al-Sunnah* movement, leaving its methodological consequences underexplored. Additionally, while Lubis's views have been studied in the Indonesian context, there is a lack of critical analysis of how his critique challenges global trends in Islamic legal scholarship and its practical implications for the application of Shari'ah in Muslim societies.

This study provides a novel contribution to the field by offering a comprehensive analysis of Dalimi Lubis's rejection of the Sunnah within the framework of *uṣhūl al-fiqh* and *istinbāt al-aḥkām*. By examining Lubis's critique from a methodological perspective, this research seeks to bridge the gap between theological debates and practical legal reasoning. Furthermore, the study offers an integrative approach that connects Lubis's ideas to global trends in Islamic legal reform, thereby providing new insights into the ongoing discourse on Islamic jurisprudence. In doing so, this research contributes to the academic understanding of how alternative approaches to the Sunnah might reshape legal reasoning and the application of Shari'ah in contemporary Muslim societies.

The primary objectives of this study are to critically analyze Dalimi Lubis's rejection of the Sunnah within the context of *uṣhūl al-fiqh* (Islamic legal methodology) and *istinbāt al-aḥkām* (legal deduction), particularly examining how his critique challenges the traditional framework of Islamic jurisprudence. Additionally, this study aims to evaluate the implications of Lubis's critique on the practical functioning of Islamic law, focusing on its

impact on legal reasoning and the application of Shari'ah in contemporary Muslim societies. Lastly, this research seeks to contribute to the ongoing discourse on the tension between traditionalism and rationalism in Islamic legal thought, specifically within the Indonesian Islamic discourse, while assessing the feasibility of reforming Islamic jurisprudence by prioritizing the Qur'an alone as the source of guidance.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach with a library research method that is descriptive-analytical in nature to examine the thoughts of Dalimi Lubis from the perspective of Islamic law. Its main focus is to trace the construction of his religious views concerning criticism of Hadith and Sunnah, as well as to assess the implications of these views on the status of the Sunnah as the secondary source of law within the Sharia system. The study not only seeks to understand the ideas of Dalimi Lubis but also evaluates their conformity with the principles of *ushūl al-fiqh* and the methodology of *istinbāt al-aḥkām*. The primary data sources for this study are the written works of Dalimi Lubis, such as Alam Barzakh (1985) and *Mempertanyakan Eksistensi Hadis/Sunnah dalam Ajaran Islam*, which are analyzed in depth to understand his arguments, critiques, and rationality. In addition, the study utilizes secondary sources, including classical and contemporary Islamic literature, academic journals, articles, and documents related to the discourse on the authority of the Sunnah, from both theological and Islamic legal perspectives. The data collection and analysis techniques are conducted through systematic document study, mapping of key ideas, comparison with *ushūl fiqh* literature, and evaluation of the legitimacy of the arguments presented. Through this library research method, the study can assess how the ideas rejecting the Sunnah are understood, debated, and their impact on the comprehension and implementation of Islamic law within theoretical and historical frameworks, without relying on field data collection.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Biography of Dalimi Lubis: From Local Tradition to Epistemological Critique of the Sunnah

Dalimi Lubis was born in 1940 in Paraman Ampalu, a village in Pasaman Regency, West Sumatra, into a devout Muslim family. His father, Labai Abbas Mukmin, was an elementary school teacher (Madrrasah Ibtidaiyah) and an active preacher in rural areas, while his mother, Nurmala, was an ethnic Minangkabau woman raised in a strong Islamic tradition. Growing up in a religious environment that shaped his spiritual character from an early age, Dalimi Lubis showed an early interest in religious education and Islamic thought. Dalimi Lubis's formal education began at Elementary School Mu'allimin Muhammadiyah Ujung Gading, before he moved on to Madrasah Ibtidaiyah and continued to the Religious Teacher Education. His intellectual journey advanced in 1965 when he enrolled at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Muhammadiyah Padang Panjang, a city known as the "Verandah of Mecca." There, he majored in Aqidah (creed) and Philosophy, a field of study that would later significantly influence the rational and critical direction of his thought. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in 1971 and subsequently pursued full undergraduate studies in the same field at the Faculty of Ushuluddin, IAIN Imam Bonjol Padang, completing them in 1985.

Dalimi Lubis's professional career began as a religious teacher at Elementary School Silaping, before moving to several other schools in Padang Panjang, including SD Negeri and SKKA Padang Panjang, with over 17 years of service (1965–1982). The year 1983 marked a turning point in his career when he began working as an administrative officer at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Padang Panjang, eventually serving as Head of the Islamic Civilization Subdivision and retiring in 1996.

Unlike his father, whose work focused on oral preaching, Dalimi Lubis was more interested in the intellectual domain, particularly philosophy, logic, and the study of the Qur'an and Hadith. He believed that philosophical and logical approaches were key to sharpening critical thinking and scientific reasoning, especially in confronting dogmatic religious discourse. Within the scholarly tradition he pursued, he studied under prominent figures such as Buya Harun al-Ma'anī, Mawardi Muhammad, Johar Mahmud, Johan Nurdin, and Nazwar Syamsu. Nevertheless, these intellectual relationships did not make him passively accept his teachers' views; on the contrary, he frequently questioned and critiqued the authority of Hadith as a normative source of Islamic teachings.

As a public intellectual, Dalimi Lubis was active in writing for major Islamic media outlets such as *The Voice of Muhammadiyah*. One of his most controversial works is *Alam Barzakh* (1981), along with *Questioning the Existence of Hadith and the Prophet's Sunnah in Islamic Teachings*, which explicitly expressed doubts about the validity and authority of the Sunnah as a source of Islamic law. His thought is often associated with the *Inkar al-Sunnah* movement, although he preferred to be regarded as a seeker of truth grounded in the principles of rationality and the textuality of the Qur'an.

Due to his boldness in expressing views contrary to mainstream Islam in Indonesia, Dalimi Lubis faced social and institutional pressures. He experienced persecution, including summonses by the police, prosecutors, as well as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ulema Council [24]. Nevertheless, he remained consistent in his stance and showed no signs of compromise in voicing his critiques of classical Hadith constructions, which he considered epistemologically problematic.

The life and thought of Dalimi Lubis represent an important case of the dialectic between tradition and reform in Islamic studies in Indonesia. He embodies a peripheral intellectual attempting to deconstruct established theological foundations while expanding the space for critical discourse in understanding religious authority. Understanding Dalimi Lubis's intellectual biography is therefore not only essential for tracing the local *Inkar al-Sunnah* discourse but also for reflecting on the tension between orthodoxy and rationality in contemporary Islamic development.

Dalimi Lubis's Critique of Hadith and the Authority of the Sunnah in Islam

In the Islamic scholarly tradition, Hadith is understood as everything that comes from Prophet Muhammad, whether in the form of his sayings, actions, approvals, or attributes. This definition has been widely accepted by scholars and forms the basis for understanding the Sunnah as a source of Islamic law after the Qur'an. However, Dalimi Lubis, a critical intellectual from West Sumatra, explicitly rejects this definition. His rejection is not merely reactive but is grounded in rational-theological arguments based on his interpretation of several Qur'anic verses that mention the terms "hadith" and "sunnah."

First, Prophet Muhammad's Role Is Only as the Conveyer of Revelation. According to Dalimi Lubis, the use of the term *sunnah* in the Qur'an for example in Surah Ali Imran (3):137, al-Isra (17):77, al-Anfal (8):38, al-Hijr (15):13, al-Kahfi (18):55, and al-Ahzab (33):38 always refers to *sunnatullah*, meaning the universal decrees and laws of Allah concerning past communities. The concept of the Prophet's *Sunnah*, as understood by scholars, lacks textual basis in the Qur'an and, according to Dalimi Lubis, represents an illegitimate distortion of meaning.

Dalimi Lubis asserts that the term "Hadith of the Prophet" in the Qur'an does not refer to the Prophet's personal speech, actions, or approvals, but exclusively to the Hadith of Allah that is, the Qur'anic verses revealed to the Prophet and conveyed to the community [25], [26]. The Prophet's function is that of a messenger (*muballigh*), not as a source of independent teachings outside the Qur'an. This view is grounded in his understanding of verses such as Surah al-Ma'idah [5]:99, which states, "The Messenger's duty is only to convey," and Surah an-Najm (53):3–4, which emphasizes, "He does not speak from his own desire; it is only revelation revealed" [27].

In his work *Alam Barzakh*, Dalimi Lubis rejects the authenticity of all Hadiths narrated by the companions, such as Abu Hurairah, Mu'adh bin Jabal, Ibn Abbas, Aisyah, and others, as well as those codified by the Hadith masters like Bukhari, Muslim, and Abu Dawud. He considers all such narrations as human constructions and the result of scholarly manipulation that, in his view, distorted Islam from the purity of the Qur'an [28], [29] [30].

Dalimi Lubis even explicitly accuses Imam al-Syafi'i of being a pioneer in the massive codification of Hadith, which, according to him, was intended to direct Muslims toward teachings not originating from Allah. This perspective implies that the authority of Hadith is not only questionable but must be entirely rejected, as it contradicts the principles of *tawhid* and the purity of divine revelation. Dalimi Lubis emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between Prophet Muhammad's role as a messenger and as an ordinary human being. As a messenger, he is solely responsible for conveying Allah's revelation, without legislative authority outside the Qur'an. As an ordinary human, Muhammad may act as a leader (*ulil amri*), as mentioned in Surah an-Nisa (4):59 [31], [32]. However, according to Dalimi Lubis, obedience to the Prophet in this verse should be understood as obedience to the revelation, not to his personal opinions or daily actions.

Dalimi Lubis also rejects the interpretations of scholars regarding Surah an-Nahl [16]:44, which is often cited as proof that the Prophet explained the Qur'an through his words, actions, and decrees. In his view, such interpretations constitute manipulation of meaning and deviate from the Qur'an's original intent. He maintains that the verse merely emphasizes that the Prophet's explanation is limited to conveying and elucidating Qur'anic verses, not through external sources such as Hadith codified by scholars.

Second, the Qur'an as the Sole Source of Islamic Teachings. A central aspect of Dalimi Lubis's rejection of Hadith as a source of Islamic teachings is his conviction that the Qur'an is a complete and perfect scripture. According to him, the Qur'an encompasses all teachings, laws, and guidance necessary for human life in this world and the hereafter. Therefore, any additions to the Qur'an whether in the form of Hadith, *Sunnah*, *ijma'*, or *qiyas* are viewed as deviations that endanger the purity of Islam [33], [34]. Furthermore, Dalimi Lubis categorizes

efforts to make sources other than the Qur'an a reference for religion as acts bordering on shirk (associating partners with Allah), as they add legal authority beyond Allah's own.

The main basis for this argument comes from Surah al-An'ām [6]:57. Dalimi Lubis interprets it as affirming that the sole legal authority in Islam belongs to Allah, concretely manifested through the revelation, namely the Qur'an. In Dalimi Lubis's view, the Qur'an is not only a source of normative teachings but also the only legitimate reference for understanding all aspects of life, without requiring additional interpretations from external sources, including the Prophet's Hadith.

Dalimi Lubis also holds that all Qur'anic verses were revealed to address every human problem, whether spiritual, social, or legal. He rejects the classical view that some Qur'anic verses are mujmal (general) and require explanation through the Prophet's Hadith. According to him, such claims arise from a failure to study the Qur'an comprehensively. If one truly studies and internalizes the Qur'an, all its verses are clear, detailed, and understandable by reason alone, without reliance on the Hadith tradition [35], [36] [37]. Within this framework, Dalimi Lubis rejects the authority of Hadith as a prerequisite for understanding Islam. For him, the Qur'an already accommodates all human needs, and comprehension can be developed directly through rational reasoning. Consequently, legal deduction (istinbat), Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir), or normative religious approaches should not rely on Hadith, as that would imply adding to the already perfect revelation [38], [39]. Using Hadith as a religious reference, therefore, undermines the perfection of the Qur'an as Allah's word.

One key argument Dalimi Lubis raises in rejecting the authority of Hadith is the existence of reports showing that the Prophet explicitly forbade his companions from writing or recording Hadith. For Dalimi Lubis, this prohibition was not merely a temporary or technical measure but a preventive action with deep theological significance. He interprets the prohibition as intended to preserve the purity of the Qur'an as the sole source of Islamic law and to prevent Muslims from later elevating Hadith to a level equal to or above the Qur'an in religious practice. In this context, the prohibition of writing Hadith is understood as a form of safeguarding the singular authority of divine revelation. Furthermore, Dalimi Lubis connects his view to several Qur'anic verses, especially Surah al-Mā'idah [5]:44, 45, and 47, which affirm that those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are considered disbelievers, unjust, and sinful. Dalimi Lubis interprets these verses as reinforcing that the only law that must be referenced is the law from revelation, namely the Qur'an. Consequently, using Hadith as a basis for law is seen as a deviation from Allah's command and potentially leads one away from tawhid.

This view is reinforced by Dalimi Lubis's analysis of the story of Abu Syah, a companion who reported that he requested permission from the Prophet to write something due to memory limitations. According to Dalimi Lubis, what Abu Syah sought to record was not Hadith but Qur'anic verses conveyed by the Prophet in his sermon. Therefore, this event cannot be used to justify the practice of recording Hadith. On the contrary, it demonstrates that during the prophetic era, the primary focus was on preserving the Qur'an, not documenting the Prophet's sayings or actions in general. In Dalimi Lubis's perspective, the prohibition of recording Hadith was not only historical but also a reflection of the prophetic intention to ensure that Muslims would not be misled into treating other sources even if originating from the Prophet as legal authorities equal to the Qur'an. This narrative

underscores Dalimi Lubis's rejection of the legitimacy of Hadith as a source of Islamic teachings and strengthens his central idea of the Qur'an's singular supremacy as Allah's final and perfect law.

Hadith as a Source of Division and Theological Construction in the Perspective of Islamic Law

One of the most fundamental and controversial critiques put forward by Dalimi Lubis regarding the authority of Hadith and Sunnah is his view that both serve as primary sources of theological disintegration and internal division within the Muslim community. From the perspective of Islamic law, Lubis rejects the assumption that the Prophet Muhammad, who is explicitly described in the Qur'an as rahmatan lil-'ālamīn (a mercy to all worlds), could be the source of teachings that produce conflict, sectarian division, or theological violence among Muslims [40], [41] [42]. He emphasizes that any teaching causing division is a human construction that, consciously or unconsciously, distorts the pure essence of tawhid contained in the Qur'an. Accordingly, Hadiths that have the potential to incite conflict or serve as the basis for extreme sectarian differentiation, according to Lubis, cannot be valid Dalimi Lubis used as legal references.

In his radical argument, Lubis explicitly identifies Imam al-Syafi'i as a key figure in the institutionalization and systematization of Hadith compilation. He accuses al-Syafi'i of constructing the epistemic architecture underlying the massive codification of Hadith, which was subsequently inherited by later generations, including Ahmad ibn Hanbal who Lubis claims memorized millions of Hadiths as well as the compilers of canonical collections such as al-Bukhari and Muslim. From an Islamic law perspective, this codification not only established Hadith as a secondary source of law after the Qur'an but also created a sacralization of these texts, placing them in a position almost equal to, or even more dominant than, the Qur'an in legal and theological discourse. This has direct implications for *istinbat* (legal deduction), as sacralized Hadiths often became operational *fiqh* references that undermine the supremacy of the Qur'an.

According to Lubis, the theological consequences of Hadith sacralization are highly problematic and can be categorized as epistemological shirk, the association of Allah's legal authority with human narrative constructions claiming prophetic legitimacy. In the context of Islamic law, all *fiqh* schools derived from Hadith authority are seen as products of intellectual and theological deviation, separating the community from authentic tawhid teachings. He explicitly rejects the validity of classical *madhabs* that, in his view, rely on fabricated Hadiths and speculative interpretations of the Prophet's practices. The dominance of *madhhabism*, especially traditions rooted in *Ahl al-Hadith*, lacks both historical and theological legitimacy within the framework of the prophetic message.

As an epistemological alternative within Islamic legal thought, Dalimi Lubis advocates a purification of Islamic teachings based exclusively on the Qur'an. He rejects all narratives attributed to the Prophet whether sayings, actions, or approvals that are not directly recorded in the Qur'an. In his view, the only authentic and valid Hadith is the Qur'an itself, as it is divine revelation delivered to the Prophet and directly conveyed to the community. Any addition beyond this is considered a cultural construct of scholars that cannot serve as normative sources in Islam. Lubis calls for the entire discourse of Islamic law and theology to

be reoriented toward the Qur'an as the sole foundation of tawhid and Sharia, free from speculative or historical interpretations of Hadith.

Through this approach, Lubis emphasizes that the authority of Hadith and Sunnah is not only a source of division among Muslims but also a theological construction that diverts the community from the purity of tawhid in the Qur'an. The sacralization of Hadith is viewed as a form of epistemological shirk, while the purification of Islamic teachings through the Qur'an becomes a solution to uphold the supremacy of revelation, ensure uniformity in legal practice, and maintain the integrity of the Sharia system from the perspective of Islamic law.

Discussion

In this study, Dalimi Lubis's critique of Hadith and its legitimacy as a source of Islamic law is critically examined. Lubis asserts that the Hadith, as a source of religious authority, does not hold normative value and should be disregarded in favor of the Qur'an alone. He argues that the Sunnah, traditionally understood as the teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, should be interpreted as *sunnatullah* the decrees of Allah, not as personal acts or sayings of the Prophet. Lubis emphasizes the perfection and completeness of the Qur'an, positing that it alone is sufficient for guiding the Muslim community. This position challenges centuries of scholarship that have integrated Hadith into Islamic legal and theological frameworks. Furthermore, Lubis critiques the early prohibition on recording Hadith, which he interprets as an attempt to safeguard the purity of the Qur'an, ensuring that no source other than the Qur'an becomes normative. His argument highlights the potential theological and social consequences of Hadith's dominance, suggesting that it has caused division within the Muslim community, promoting epistemological shirk by elevating human constructions to a status equal to divine revelation.

When comparing the findings of this study with global research, it is evident that Lubis's critique resonates with wider trends in Islamic reform movements. Contemporary scholarship reveals a growing discourse around the epistemological position of Hadith as a normative source, where critics argue for re-evaluation of Hadith authority in light of textual and methodological concerns [43], [44]. These studies reflect modern debates on Hadith criticism that interrogate authenticity, methodological rigor, and the interpretive frameworks used in classical and modern Hadith sciences, despite not always rejecting Hadith wholesale. However, the findings of this study diverge from global studies in their emphasis on Lubis's specific socio-theological context within Indonesia, where his critique is shaped by local scholarly traditions and distinctive epistemological claims not fully matched in broader international literature [45].

For instance, Amir [46] emphasizes the rationalist critique of Hadith, but places more focus on the historical and methodological debates rather than the theological implications of Hadith's dominance, as Lubis does. Moreover, Mappasessu [47] examines the epistemological shift away from Hadith, noting how reformists argue for a Qur'anic-centric approach but does not go as far as Lubis in rejecting Hadith entirely as a source of Islamic law. The discrepancies between these studies and Lubis's work could be attributed to cultural and contextual factors, particularly the emphasis on preserving community unity and theological continuity in traditional Islamic thought, which is less pronounced in Lubis's more radical stance.

The findings of this research also contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse in Indonesia, where the critique of Hadith has been gaining attention, particularly through figures like Lubis. Studies such as Harun [48] and Masruhan [49] engage with similar critiques, but focus on Lubis's controversial ideas as part of a broader national conversation about Islamic reform. These studies highlight the tension between traditional Islamic scholarship and modern rationalist critiques, especially in the context of Indonesia, where the integration of Islamic law with modern governance remains a point of contention. While these studies focus on the sociopolitical dimensions of the *Inkar al-Sunnah* movement, this research adds a theoretical and methodological perspective, extending the critique to the very foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. The contrast between Lubis's views and the more moderate Indonesian critiques could be seen as a reflection of Indonesia's complex relationship with Islamic law, balancing tradition with the demands of modernity.

From a theoretical perspective, Lubis's critique challenges the core of *ushūl al-fiqh*, the Islamic legal methodology. His rejection of Hadith as a source of Islamic law forces a reconsideration of the legal principles that have shaped Islamic jurisprudence for centuries. Traditional Islamic legal theory, based on the dual authority of the Qur'an and Sunnah, forms the basis of *istinbāt al-aḥkām* (legal deduction). Lubis's position suggests a paradigm shift toward a Qur'anic-centric approach, where legal reasoning would be derived solely from the Qur'an, without the interpretive aid of the Sunnah. This perspective challenges the integration of *ijma'* (consensus) and *qiyas* (analogy), which rely on the Sunnah as a foundational text for legal deductions. His views present an epistemological critique that not only questions the legitimacy of Hadith but also disrupts the methodological underpinnings of Islamic law, proposing a radical rethinking of how legal principles should be deduced and applied.

The pedagogical implications of Lubis's critique are significant, particularly in the context of Islamic education. Lubis's rejection of Hadith challenges educators to rethink the sources of Islamic knowledge and legal frameworks taught to students. If Lubis's perspective were adopted, it would require a reevaluation of curricula that emphasize both the Qur'an and Sunnah in the study of Islamic law and theology. This could lead to an education system more focused on the Qur'anic text as the sole source of guidance, with less emphasis on Hadith literature. For educators, this shift may require revisiting teaching methods, ensuring that students are equipped with the skills to engage with the Qur'an independently, without relying on the explanatory role traditionally played by Hadith.

The findings of this study also have potential policy implications, especially concerning the role of Hadith in Islamic legal frameworks and its influence on governance and social policy. If Lubis's critique were to be taken seriously, it could lead to significant shifts in Islamic law, potentially impacting policies related to family law, criminal justice, and social regulations that have historically relied on Hadith. In terms of policy, this study suggests a need for discussions on the role of Hadith in shaping legal and social norms in Indonesia and beyond, particularly in countries where Islamic law is implemented alongside civil law. Policy changes might be needed to address the tensions between traditionalist and reformist approaches to Islamic law, with implications for social stability, legal continuity, and the integrity of the religious community.

This study's novelty lies in its critical synthesis of Dalimi Lubis's critique of Hadith with the normative literature of *ushūl al-fiqh*, offering an integrative perspective that links

epistemological and legal dimensions. Unlike previous studies that have focused solely on the theological or historical aspects of Lubis's views, this research explores the broader implications of rejecting the Sunnah for the structure of Islamic legal reasoning. By positioning Lubis's critique within the context of contemporary Islamic legal reform, this study contributes new insights into the evolving discourse on Islamic jurisprudence, highlighting both the potential benefits and risks of such a radical shift in legal methodology.

One limitation of this study is its exclusive focus on the theoretical aspects of Lubis's critique, without delving into empirical research or fieldwork to understand how his views are received by broader communities of Islamic scholars and practitioners. The study also concentrates on Lubis's views in the Indonesian context, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to other Islamic societies. Future research could expand on this by conducting surveys or interviews with scholars and practitioners to gauge the impact of Lubis's critique on Islamic legal practice in Indonesia and other regions. Additionally, future studies could explore the practical implications of implementing a Qur'anic-centric legal system, particularly in areas such as family law, religious observances, and criminal justice.

CONCLUSION

Dalimi Lubis's thought on the authority of Hadith and Sunnah represents a profound epistemological critique of the structure of religious authority in Islam. His critique is not merely a reactive rejection of tradition but emerges from a strong theological commitment to the principle of tawhid and the supremacy of the Qur'an as the sole authentic source of Islamic teachings. From an Islamic legal perspective, Lubis argues that the dominance of Hadith and the madhhab system dependent on it has displaced the Qur'an's central position, creating a parallel authority that is problematic both theologically and methodologically. His concept of "epistemological shirk" serves as an innovative analytical tool to understand how the sacralization of non-Qur'anic texts can lead to deviations within the structure of Islamic authority. The novelty of Lubis's thought lies in his audacity to propose an alternative paradigm in Islamic legal studies: he rejects all legitimacy of Hadith as a source of law and asserts that the Qur'an is entirely sufficient as a normative, moral, and social guide. Lubis's approach is not only critical but epistemological, emphasizing the rationality and textual integrity of the Qur'an as the single foundation. This perspective opens new methodological possibilities for contemporary Islamic studies, enabling the development of law and theology grounded purely in rational reflection on divine revelation, without human-traditional interventions. However, Lubis's thought is not without academic critique. First, his total rejection of Hadith and classical madhhabs risks severing historical continuity with Islamic practice, as much of fiqh and ritual tradition in real-world contexts relies operationally on Hadith. Second, his argument that the Qur'an is complete for all human problems faces practical challenges, particularly concerning contemporary issues not explicitly addressed in the text. Third, his radical perspective may provoke social controversy and institutional resistance, necessitating a dialogical approach for broader academic acceptance. The implications of Lubis's thought are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, it expands the discourse on the epistemology of Islamic law by emphasizing the supremacy of revelation and critiquing the legitimacy of human additions. Practically, it opens avenues for methodological renewal in contemporary Islamic studies, promoting a critical, rational, and textual approach to the Qur'an as the sole source of law.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION

The research was conceptualized and theoretically framed by E.S., who also conducted the primary literature review and drafted the initial manuscript, integrating contemporary Islamic legal perspectives into the discussion. A.B. contributed to the research methodology, supervised the data analysis process, and provided substantive revisions to ensure academic coherence and alignment between theory, findings, and the Islamic legal context. E.S. was responsible for the collection and mapping of secondary literature, verification of references, and comparative analysis of classical and contemporary sources, including the preparation of tables and citations relevant to the study. All authors participated in the final manuscript preparation, approved the final version, and take responsibility for the accuracy of the published content.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

DECLARATION OF USE OF AI IN SCIENTIFIC WRITING

The authors used several generative AI tools in the process. ChatGPT was used to help organise complex concepts, while Grammarly was employed to enhance the grammar, style, readability of the text and improve the overall clarity of the writing. Although these tools provided valuable support, the researcher wrote all the content and conclusions.

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